Meaning and Use.
Paper presented at the International Conference Ludwig Wittgenstein and Analytical Philosophy, Veliko Tarnovo, 2004. Ed. by M. Stoicheva. Sofia: Kutu Publishing House, 2005, pp. 76-81. ISBN 954-91682-1-2
The paper comments on the radical change in Wittgenstein’s understanding of language – a change in the focus from propositions and states of affairs in the world (thought - language – world relation) in Tractatus Logico-philosophicus to language use that is inseparable from man’s practical activities in Philosophical Investigations. In fact, the notion language game that Wittgenstein introduces does not tell us much how natural language works; a language game is only an analogy for how language is used in different situations. A language game illustrates the endless variations in how language describes the world, but it tells us nothing about the intentions of the speaker and speaker’s meaning. In other words, Wittgenstein’s view does not explicate the gap between what is said and what is meant; a gap central for Grice and Searle in their view on language use and, more specifically, central for Grice’s inferential model of communication that accounts for both verbal and non-verbal communication.
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language-world relation, proposition, language game, speaker's intentions, speaker's meaning
Language, Linguistics, Literature and Theory of Literature