Pragmatic Inference and Deductive Rules.
Сб. по случай 13-годишнината на Философския факултет на ВТУ "Св. св. Кирил и Методий" "Съвременни философски изследвания". Ред. В. Бузов et al. Велико Търново: УИ “Св. св. Кирил и Методий”, 2011, с. 174-187. ISBN 978-954-524-806-1 COBISS.BG-ID 1238994916
In "Pragmatic Inference and Deductive Rules" the object of critical analysis is the nature of common sense logic or pragmatic inference in the production and understanding of utterances. Some scholars hold the view that common sense reasoning has inductive properties, other scholars that it has deductive ones and yet others hold the view that it has both deductive and inductive properties. The author supports the view that pragmatic inference in some contexts is in the form of deduction, in others it stands in contradiction to deduction and eliminates it. A partial overlap between deduction and pragmatic inference is possible since deductive rules might be considered second order abstractions that operate on first order structures, which in tern are based on practical reasoning in terms of cause-and-effect, reason-and-consequence, goal-means and other relations. Modus ponens is the most frequently used deductive rule in pragmatic reasoning, while modus tollens is less frequently used. Possible reasons for such a difference in application are pointed out.
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Language, Linguistics, Literature and Theory of Literature