Norms as Decisions
ARHE, Casopis za filozofii, N2, Novi Sad, pp.113-117.
what is the ontological (and logical) status of a normative decision or performative? It would seem
that norms themselves get lost in the act that gives validity to them. If normative authorities are in a relation of
subordination, how can we distinguish between norms enacted by them as per their binding force? In what sense
can we regard normative decisions and respective normative regulations as rational ones? The veracity and
validity of norms, related to deontic propositions, have common logical properties (Wolenski 1996). If the choice
of normative function has, as a premise, a certain knowledge of the real world and its deontic alternatives, why
should one reject the possibility to evaluate norms as true or false? Indeed, this is hardly a matter of terminology
as considered by H. N. Castaneda (Castaneda 1982, p.24). Could we present the process of normative derogation
as performative utterance? Herein lies one of the foremost difficulties inherent to the the so-called expressive conception of norms (Alchourron, Bulygin 1981, p.104-105). How is the will of a normative authority related to
the purpose, what realization is aimed at by the establishment of a normative regulation? Are norms and normative decisions subject to verification?
This paper is an attempt to find out the right way to giving grounded answers to some of these key
questions. The spotlighting of the philosophical foundations of the theories of normative discourse is a necessary
precondition for resolving debates, avoiding paradoxes; for the evolvement of a generally-acceptable system of
deontic logic. It would, thereby, have good chances to turn into a method and an effective tool of social knowledge. Deontic logic directly bears on the nature of its specific object of study - human actions and their multiform determinations.
norms, decisions, deontic logic