Deceiving as a Speech Act.
Contrastive Linguistics, 2001, 26(3), pp. 5-14. Print ISSN 0204-8701
In the paper, arguments are provided for an alternative explication of lying, alternative to the one proposed by L. Coleman and P. Kay within the format of the prototype theory. According to the present view, lying is not captured by the opposition truth-untruth: rather, it belongs to manipulative discourse. When we make an untrue statement, we do so because we have no knowledge of its true counterpart; when we lie, we know its true counterpart, yet we intentionally withhold its truth from the listener. On the other hand, "white lies" are socially motivated and are regulated by the politeness principle. Lying or deceiving is analyzed as a composite speech act that has the form of an actual conditional whose antecedent plays the role of a primary and its consequent of a secondary speech act.
lying, manipulative discourse
Language, Linguistics, Literature and Theory of Literature